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ABSTRACT: This paper argues against the paradigm of mechanistic reductionism in relation to 
consciousness. The paradigm impoverishes reality by dismissing the greater part of the 
experienced world in exchange for control over a small segment. The distortion limits nature 
with respect to the concept of time and mistakenly defines consciousness as a “property.” The 
concept of time in the paradigm provides no way to account for remembering other than storage 
and mechanical retrieval of records of past events, erroneously called “memories.” The error is 
the conversion of verbs into nouns: taking actions as bytes and bits of data. Once this is allowed, 
the idea that the person is the mind, the mind is the brain and the brain is a computer becomes 
the bedrock upon which the edifice of AI rises beyond its capacity as a useful tool and betrays 
humanity by blurring the distinction between self and machine. An alternative view is 
introduced which suggests the idea of Developmental Time instead of Physical Time and 
replaces “consciousness” with “experience.” 
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In her book Maps of  the Mind, science writer Rita Carter put forward a theory, based 
on findings of Neuroscience, that every human being is a "programmable machine." 
More specifically, our brains are computing machines and we are our brains.2 This 
view evokes the following equation: Person = Mind = Brain = Computer, or PMBCI 
                                                          
1 Editor’s note: Foundations of Mind, the independent research group that has provided the papers for this 
special edition, has never taken either corporate or state money and is financed entirely by donations. 
Authors keep copyright without paying. The typical fee for this charged by open-access journals such as 
those published by PLOS, is around $2k. If you value this project, and wish to see further such 
proceedings from this group, we ask you to consider donating to Foundations of Mind – as little as $5 per 
download, through their website: http://www.foundationsofmind.org/donate. This will ensure there will 
be further published proceedings on the foundations of mind like this one for you and others to enjoy free. 
2 Carter 1998, 207. 
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(the Person, the Mind, the Brain and the Computer are Identical). This theory relies on 
several serious flaws of conceptual confusion, and others have taken her views to task 
for those errors, but among enthusiasts and researchers pursuing the development of 
"Artificial Intelligence" conceptual errors such as those committed by Carter are not 
merely ignored, they seem to be invisible. For many, the distinction between humans 
and machines has virtually disappeared.   
The ease with which large segments not only of the scientific world, but of the 
general public as well, accede to this idea is not difficult to understand. It suits physics, 
where mechanistic reductionism applied to such unruly things as "consciousness" is the 
favored paradigm. It is also a view long entrenched in popular culture via science 
fiction, where sentient robots such as R2D2 and C3PO are merely the latest versions of 
machines which think, feel, care and behave like humans but have computers for 
"brains". These are accepted as characters on an equal standing with their flesh and 
blood compatriots. 
A singular advantage of PMBCI is that it can be understood as a solution to the 
long-standing problem of mind-body dualism, the view that there is an absolute 
separation between mind, consciousness and self on the one hand and the physical 
body on the other. PMBCI would eliminate any remnant of dualism simply by calling 
the mind a computer located in the cranium. Somewhere in the intricacies of the 
brain-computer is a neuron, or a group of them, which “generate” a property called 
consciousness.  
For a time, it was indeed thought that the brain operates as a computer. An 
important example of this is that memory, in a real human being, has been understood 
as the recovery of  "memories" stored somewhere in the neurons of the brain. Since 
that is precisely how computers “remember” things as well – by storing data in digital 
form in “memory banks” and accessing the data when needed by means of 
programmed algorithms, the analogy between memory in computers and memory in 
persons seems perfect. 
This is the ubiquitous storage theory of  memory, and it is so widely accepted that one 
would not be far off base by saying it is universally understood to be how memory 
works. The trouble is that this widespread presupposition about remembering is 
seriously flawed, but to challenge it goes so violently against the dominant paradigm of 
present thinking that to suggest it is wrong is simply to ask for instant dismissal, 
accompanied by a stupendous horselaugh from just about everyone. 
The underlying reason for the dismissal of objections to the storage theory is that 
the theory goes contrary to the dominant paradigm. This paradigm of scientific 
presuppositions has achieved near-universal acceptance, because physics – or to be 
more precise, the mathematical formulae that make up its language of description – 
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has come to be understood as the science that describes the fundamental nature of 
everything, with its corollary that whatever physics cannot describe must be illusory.  
As one noted physicist has said, we and everything around us are only “atoms and 
empty space,” and to think otherwise is to give in to a “figment of imagination.”3 
The dominant paradigm is based on three related ideas. The first is the view of 
time employed in physics (and accepted by just about everyone else). This view is what 
has been called geometrical time, or physical time. It is geometrical, because it is 
derived from the notion that time is a further dimension of space, and a time-line is a 
line of units of measure just as the three dimensions of space are also identified by lines 
of discrete homogenous units of measure. The second idea is the theory of neo-
Darwinian evolution, in which time begins from an unexplained “singularity” with the 
so-called “Big Bang.” This is conceived of as an explosion of energy, which proceeds to 
condense into the subatomic particles making up what we understand as matter.  
At this point we arrive at the necessity for an explanation of how it is that “atoms 
and empty space” have apparently gone through a process eventuating in the existence 
of something that is inexplicable in physical terms. That something is Life, with its 
corollary of purposive behavior. Such behavior must exist to satisfy the doctrine of 
“survival of the fittest,” since the concept of “fittest” has no meaning whatsoever as far 
as inanimate matter is concerned. For a stone, for instance, to “survive” it would have 
to remain unchanged over time. Given such things as heating, cooling, and erosion, 
even a stone cannot remain unchanged. But if the stone persists in the same state (not 
counting internal molecular or atomic-level motion) for even a few moments, the idea 
that it is “surviving” would have only a material meaning and have nothing to do with 
the survival of a living organism.  
What is alive survives only when it maintains a certain equilibrium among the many 
interpenetrating functions that individually serve themselves while collectively serving 
the ongoing metabolic processes of living. In very elementary organisms this may be 
constituted by continuation of simple nutritive functions. The mark of a living organism 
is that it is made up of functional systems that are interrelated and are nothing at all 
like what is found in inanimate matter. 
By this route we come, then, to the problem of explaining the existence of life 
within a field of dead matter. It is not my purpose here to engage further in discussion 
of this problem, other than to point out that while science has attempted to explain the 
advent of life from random encounters of matter, it has failed to do so in any 
                                                          
3 Ferry 2010. The view is self-nullified because its reference to our imagination ignores the question as to 
how atoms and empty space might imagine anything at all. This error is an example of how many 
physicists and other scientists are lacking in fundamental principles of conceptual analysis. 
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convincing way. Most importantly, it cannot create life out of dead matter by any 
physical means. And if you cannot explain the development of life from dead matter, 
you cannot also explain the existence and nature of memory; for memory requires 
experience, and only living things have experience. What is remembered is what is 
experienced. So suddenly our discussion has entered the field that has been awaiting us 
all along, the field of experience and the remembering of what is experienced.  
One of the serious conceptual problems that afflict efforts to answer the question of 
“what is consciousness?” is the common characterization of “consciousness” as 
referring to some sort of property. Matter, after all, may possess properties, so perhaps 
consciousness is a property of the mind generated by certain neurons in the brain. It is 
this characterization that leads researchers into futile endeavors to locate the source or 
cause of this “property” in the brain. If we ask what possesses this property, the 
common answer would  be persons, but if you pay attention to the ethologists, what has 
consciousness may be most – or perhaps all – other living organisms as well.4 This idea 
is a shock to the dominant paradigm, and it hints of an alternate and corrective 
paradigm.  
In seeking to identify such an alternate, we would do well to abandon the weasel-
word “consciousness” and substitute “experience” for it instead. The question becomes 
“what is it that has experience?” Persons, and most certainly other things that live, 
experience things. And they remember what they experience. Once this change of 
emphasis from “consciousness” to experience, and from persons to life, occurs, ask 
yourself whether your computer experiences anything. Then ask whether any machine, 
or anything that is not a living organism, has experience.  
To start asking questions like this is to move away from the constraints imposed on 
theory by the dominant paradigm. It is a move away from the presuppositions of 
mechanistic reductionism, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, and the role of time in 
relation to memory. To give these ideas substance, we will consider the difference 
between Physical Time and what I will be referring to as Developmental Time. 
When you lay a ruler along the side of an object – let us say it is the spine of a book 
– and you observe that the book is 10 inches long, the book is not divided into discrete 
units called inches. It is only the measuring tool, the ruler, that is divided. After all, the 
book is also 25.4 centimeters long, but the book does not consist of 25.4 discrete units 
stuck together any more than it is made up of 10 other units. The same applies to the 
temporal measurement of an era, or a year, or even a moment.  
The smallest possible unit of time measurement is about 10^-43 seconds, which is 
                                                          
4 See De Waal, 2016. 
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called Planck time. (One unit of Planck time is the time it takes for light to travel 10^-35 
meters, which is about 10^20 times smaller than an atomic nucleus.) Let us imagine a 
ruler divided into Planck units, and we lay this ruler along a series of events that 
occurred over a period of 50 years. In the very first Planck unit of time as measured on 
our ruler, the first in the series of events we are measuring occurred. And in the next 
Planck unit, the next event occurred, and so on for the entire 50-year period. Our 
question is this: Just as the first time interval is over and the next occurs, is the event 
whose time of occurrence is being measured by the first unit also over? Or does it still 
exist in some way? Another way of putting it is to ask whether the events occurring 
over the 50 year period are themselves divided into pieces each lasting no more than 
one unit of Planck time, or are they, like the spine of the book, simply one continuously 
existing series of events being measured by means of arbitrarily chosen units? 
Surely, and this is the common view, once each event occurs at a given instant of 
Planck time, it is over. It is in the past, and no longer exists. This is also true of the 
corresponding moment of Planck time. It, too, has passed, to be followed by the 
subsequent moment on our time ruler. So, both the time measured and the event 
occurring at that time are now gone. They disappear together. They are over. Done 
with. Irretrievable. This means there is a correlation between the existence of the unit 
of time measurement and the event being measured. The event lasts just as long, and 
no longer than, the Planck unit assigned to it. This is what we are calling Physical 
Time. It is the time the physicist uses. Once a unit of time measurement expires, both 
the time unit and the event occurring at that instant disappear into the past. 
Everyone agrees to this. The past is past. Then they erroneously imagine that the 
only way to remember past experiences is to catch them, like a fisherman or a butterfly 
enthusiast with a net, before they can get away, and store them in jars – or if they are 
experienced events, store an account or image of them in the brain. 
The problem, however, has to do with what we have been measuring with our time 
ruler of Planck units. The events happening at a certain instant of Planck time 
disappear as soon as the Planck instant of time is over, because the past is the past. 
What we are measuring with our time ruler in this example is the sequence of events 
happening over time, and it is the inherent meaning of that sequence that each bit of it 
is gone into the past as soon as it happens. When physics deals with time, it is this kind 
of time that is being used. This is what we are calling Physical Time. 
Now, however, we must not forget the difference between what is being measured 
and the ruler being used to measure it. The ruler itself is not stuck to whatever it 
measures. It may measure any series of things happening in time and correlate its series 
of instants of time with moments taking place in what is being measured. Surely though 
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this must sound a bit loopy, for what else could we measure with a ruler made up of a 
series of time intervals? Well, there is something else we can measure but in doing so 
we will no longer be measuring physical time. We will be measuring experienced time, 
which we will eventually wish to call developmental time.  
Let us, then, imagine another scenario. As before, we lay out a Planck time ruler. 
But instead of the ruler being laid along a series of events, this time it is laid along what 
someone who is observing these events remembers about them. In this case, as before, the 
first unit of Planck time is gone once it has occurred. But does the person’s memory of 
the occurring event also disappear as soon as the Planck instant is over? This is the 
crucial question. It is crucial because if the memory of the event, just like the time 
instant measuring it, is over as soon as it happens, then 50 years from that moment the 
person who experienced the event would have no memory of  that event – unless they 
managed somehow to store a digitalized version of the event lasting only a Planck 
moment on top of another event lasting a Planck moment on top of another, and 
another, and another until, if they don’t go insane from the strain, they have managed 
to lay thousands of thousands (actually 10^43) of Planck moments of memory upon the 
others to achieve and store a “memory” of just one second of experience.  
But recall that we are exploring alternatives to the dominant paradigm of Physical 
Time, and we are measuring the flow of the person’s memories with that time ruler, not 
the flow of physical events. We do not wish to revert to the dictum of Physical Time 
when it measures events that disappear into the past. Our question should be this: does 
our memory of an event disappear into the past as soon as we experience it, or not?  
A number of philosophers, whose works have come to be ignored since the mid-
20th century, have proposed a developmental cosmology, with a developmental time 
frame.5 Among them, the French philosopher Henri Bergson proposes that the concept 
of Physical Time has a specific utilitarian value in relation to what he calls real time, 
but real time is itself not the same as physical time. What constitutes real time, he 
argues, is Durational Time. He calls it this because without it, personhood could not 
exist because it is the essence of a person to endure, not to be created and recreated 
repeatedly, instant by instant, by calling up an infinite number of “memories” an 
infinite number of times and thereby depending for their personhood on an infinite 
regress of algorithmic accesses to infinitely large memory banks of an infinite number 
of experiencing events lasting as short a time as one Planck unit of time.  
To illustrate this concept of Durational Time. Bergson points out that unless a we 
accumulate a continuously operative memory of everything experienced, we would 
                                                          
5 See McDaniel 2017, Chapters 7 and 8. 
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end up as functionally fragmented entities – more like robots with computers for 
brains.6 In short, we would end up as Rita Carter proposes: programmable machines. 
The alternative view Bergson proposes is that we remember everything. Every instant 
of our experience. And to do so is to have consciousness. Consciousness, on this view, is 
a function of our experience of Durational Time. Memory is what defines beings which 
endure, perhaps not permanently, but for the time of their living.  There are of course 
many ramifications of this theory of memory which must necessarily by addressed, and 
these Bergson has addressed exhaustively, finding a utilitarian role that Physical Time 
may play in the service of the more fundamental Durational Time.7 
If this analysis of memory and the logically necessary role it plays in the existence 
of personhood and consciousness is correct, the PMBCI view of things is not only false, 
it is a dangerous reduction of our understanding of what, and most importantly who, 
we are. It is possible that there can be no science capable of encompassing either 
experience, consciousness, and what possesses these, namely life itself. Life is Psyche, or 
“breath” as Aristotle told us so long ago, and perhaps only Psyche can discover itself. 
It has been my contention that the “dimensions” of existence as understood in 
Physics, which are geometric abstractions, are not the dimensions within which Life 
(which is not a mathematical abstraction) exists. If I am correct, then the only possible 
science of  Life – must expand beyond Physics, which is capable of explaining only that 
which is dead. 
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